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Abstract 
In the context of the UK’s ongoing review of the BBC’s Royal Charter, this article 
discusses the future of the television licence fee. As channels proliferate and new 
ways of watching television take hold, there is increasing pressure on the TV 
licence system. Drawing on an analysis of the rationale for public service 
broadcasting, the article considers whether the licence fee can be adapted to reflect 
this new world or should be replaced by a different funding model. It concludes that 
while modernising the TV licence fee to close the ‘iPlayer loophole’ would patch up 
the current system, it would be preferable to replace the licence fee altogether, 
perhaps with a household levy. Subscription may be a useful top-up for non-
essential services where a broad reach is less important. The ban on the carrying of 
advertising by the BBC should also be reconsidered. 
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1. Introduction 
In the UK, the ten-year Royal Charter setting out the purposes and duties of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is due to expire on 31 December 2016. An important part of 
the Charter review process by which a new Charter is to be put in place (see DCMS 2015a) is 
the question of the future funding of the BBC: should the television licence fee be retained 
and modernised or is it time to consider other funding mechanisms, either as a supplement to 
the licence fee or to replace it altogether? While a spate of announcements in July 2015 
suggests that parts of the licence fee settlement have already been agreed1 and substantive 
changes are likely to be pushed beyond the current Charter review, important questions 
remain concerning the current form and longer-term future of the UK’s TV licence fee. The 
switchover to digital television, continuing expansion of pay TV and growth in online 
services make this an appropriate time to examine pressures on the existing system and to 
give considered thought to the alternatives. 
Internationally, TV licence fees remain a common source of funding for public 
service broadcasting (PSB),2 especially in Europe (see details in Annex A). However, a 
handful of countries have already replaced their licence fee with an alternative funding 
system. In the Netherlands PSB has been funded out of general taxation since 2000. In 2013 
Germany replaced its licence fee with a household levy, and in the same year Finland 
switched to an income-related tax.  
While this article’s focus is on the funding of PSB, its central thesis is that the 
questions of the purposes of PSB, the services that are provided and the funding system are 
intertwined and need to be considered together (see Figure 1). The purposes of PSB naturally 
guide its scale and scope, determining the services that are offered and the audiences these 
are aimed at. Purposes also influence the choice of funding mechanism as this may affect 
their achievement, for example by weakening universality of access under a subscription 
model or biasing content towards funding providers, whether the government or commercial 
organisations. There are also interrelationships between the funding model and the services 
provided. In one direction, service provision affects ease of collection, as the ability to 
exclude non-payers varies across distribution methods, as well as popular acceptance of the 
funding model. In the other direction, the incentives of the public broadcaster, like any other 
organisation, are linked with how it is funded: the funding model may affect the choice of 
services and the way in which these are directed and delivered. 
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Figure 1: Interrelationship of purposes, services and funding of public service broadcasting. 
The backdrop to this discussion is the profound impact of technological change on the 
media sector, which has dramatically altered the television landscape since the early-1990s in 
a number of ways: 
• Huge expansion in distribution capacity through the growth of new platforms (cable 
and satellite since the late 1980s/early 1990s in the UK; Internet delivery assisted by 
faster broadband connections; mobile video enhanced by 4G/LTE networks) and 
digitisation of existing platforms (switchover to digital terrestrial television completed 
in the UK in 2012), resulting in a proliferation of channels, alongside the enormous 
amount of audio-visual content available online. 
• Globalisation: online distribution facilitates cross-border access to audio-visual 
content, tending to integrate national broadcasting markets into global ones. 
• Viewing on a variety of devices: not just the television set in the living room but also 
computers, laptops, tablets, smartphones, games consoles and digital recording 
devices. 
• Ability to charge viewers due to conditional access systems on television distribution 
platforms and Internet paywalls. 
Discussion of reforming the TV licence system is not new, and several of these developments 
were anticipated as long ago as the mid-1980s. Although the 1986 Peacock Report 
recommended retaining the TV licence fee (with modifications) in the near term and rejected 
advertising funding for the BBC, it foresaw a future without spectrum scarcity in which 
subscription would take over from the licence fee and viewers would choose for themselves 
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what and how much to pay for (Peacock 1986). During the review leading up to the present 
BBC Charter, commentators including Cox (2004) and Elstein (2004) suggested separating 
PSB funding from the institution of the BBC, with any broadcaster being able to submit bids 
to a public broadcasting authority (or ‘Arts Council of the Air’) to receive funding for 
suitable programmes.  
This article focuses on the funding issues raised in the current BBC Charter review. It 
takes as given the existence and present structure of the BBC, an analysis of which is beyond 
its scope. Although the discussion is phrased in terms of funding of the BBC, its principles 
could readily be applied to other public service broadcasters, in other countries as well as the 
UK, or to funding sources for a public broadcasting authority. Although the discussion takes 
place in the context of PSB in the UK and the BBC in particular, similar pressures are faced 
by PSB systems elsewhere and funding issues are also being considered in those countries. 
Section 2 providesa brief discussion of the TV licence fee, describing the operation of the 
UK’s TV licence system and the challenges that it now faces. Section 3 analyses the purposes 
of PSB – the system of public intervention in broadcasting of which the BBC forms a very 
large part – identifying its various rationales and considering in each case the nature of public 
broadcasting and implications for funding mechanisms. Section 4 assesses the performance of 
each funding model against the various purposes, highlighting its advantages and drawbacks. 
Based on these assessments, Section 5 summarises the performance of each model against a 
set of criteria and draws out recommendations for the future funding of the BBC. 
2. What is the TV licence fee? 
Any UK household that watches or records live TV as it is being broadcast, using any device 
– whether a television, computer, laptop, tablet, smartphone, games console, digital box or 
recorder – is required to hold a TV licence. A licence is required regardless of which 
channels or programmes are viewed: although the licence fee is used primarily to fund the 
BBC’s television, radio and online services (see Annex B), it is payable even if the household 
views only free-to-air commercial channels, or pay TV, or content from overseas 
broadcasters, and never watches the BBC. The UK’s public service broadcasters and their 
funding sources are detailed in Annex C. 
The TV licence fee is officially classified as a tax:3 it has no explicit link with use of a 
service, and part of the revenue is top-sliced to fund various public purposes (as detailed in 
Annex B). Interestingly, the link between the licence fee and use of the BBC was stronger in 
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the past than it is today: prior to 1955, when the BBC was the only show in town, the only 
reason to possess a television set was to watch the BBC, and the licence fee was equivalent to 
a subscription (in the absence of conditional access technology). Successive market and 
technological developments have weakened the link between television ownership and 
watching the BBC. The launch of Independent Television (ITV) in 1955, followed by 
Channel 4 in 1982 and Channel 5 in 1997, meant that the BBC was no longer the only reason 
to have a TV, even for terrestrial viewers; however, the limited number of terrestrial channels 
meant that it remained a major one.  
From the late 1980s onwards, the growth of multichannel cable and satellite pay TV 
further weakened the connection between television viewing and the BBC. Since the 
completion of digital switchover in 2012 all UK television households now have a choice of 
around 100 channels on terrestrial television, and many more on cable and satellite, of which 
just eight or nine come from the BBC.4 Against this backdrop it is no longer so reasonable to 
assume that all viewers would choose to have the BBC if this were a voluntary subscription. 
While the licence fee remains the most widely supported funding option for the BBC, it is no 
longer the majority choice5 and its popular acceptance may slip further as viewing time 
increasingly diverts elsewhere. Criticisms of the licence fee system include: its high 
collection costs, due in part to the absence of a conditional access system; use of criminal 
penalties to enforce payment; the regressive nature of the payment (being unrelated to 
income); and its unfairness (being unrelated to use). The last of these criticisms is a bigger 
issue now that all TV households are multichannel. 
Adaptation of the licence fee system to changing technology is not a new issue. First 
established in 1923 to pay for radio broadcasts, the licence fee was extended to television in 
1946 when the BBC recommenced its television service following the ending of World War 
II.6 The BBC began regular broadcasts in colour in July 1967; in 1968 a supplement for 
colour television was added to the licence fee. Today’s technological challenge comes from 
the development of Internet delivery in the form of the BBC’s online catch-up service, 
iPlayer. Currently a viewer may legally watch BBC programmes on iPlayer without a TV 
licence as long as viewing takes place only after the programme has been broadcast. With a 
small but growing number of viewers now accessing television services through Internet-
connected devices rather than the television set, this ‘iPlayer loophole’ threatens the BBC’s 
licence fee revenue, as well as being regarded by many people as an anomaly.7 
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The global accessibility of BBC content via iPlayer raises further issues. In an attempt 
to prevent access by viewers located outside the UK who have not paid for its content, the 
BBC implements geo-blocking,8 but this has two major flaws. First, geo-blocking restricts 
access by UK licence fee payers who happen to be travelling abroad: this ‘portability’ issue 
has recently been highlighted by UK Culture Secretary John Whittingdale (2015) and is also 
a target for the European Commission’s digital single market (DSM) strategy. Second, geo-
blocking can readily be bypassed by overseas viewers using a virtual private network (VPN) 
to connect to a proxy server. It has been estimated that almost 65m non-UK viewers – 
approximately as many as the whole UK population – are accessing BBC programmes 
without payment in this way. 9  Such viewing is liable to reduce the amounts overseas 
broadcasters are willing to pay for licensing of BBC content, undermining the income of its 
commercial subsidiary, BBC Worldwide. 
Although the UK government appears to accept the need to modernise the licence fee 
to encompass viewing on iPlayer at any time, there is as yet little detail on precisely how this 
is to be achieved. Beyond simply extending liability for the licence fee to online viewing 
which takes place at any time – catch-up and on-demand as well as live – and relying on self-
reporting, viewers might be required to enter their TV licence number in order to watch 
iPlayer. This would have the added advantage of tackling overseas viewing of iPlayer more 
effectively than the use of geo-blocking as non-payers – including those located outside the 
UK – could be excluded without eliminating portability for licence fee payers. However, for 
viewers who watch online only, this approach would effectively convert the licence fee into a 
voluntary subscription, required for viewing BBC content only, a fundamental shift in 
position that the BBC is unlikely to favour.  
A direct extension of the principle of the TV licence to online viewing would require 
a TV licence for viewing any on-demand TV service (e.g. ITV Hub, All 4) and perhaps even 
any online audio-visual service (e.g. Netflix, Amazon Prime) – a suggestion that would surely 
be vehemently opposed by those providers. Another approach might be to add a TV licence 
fee (perhaps at a lower amount) to broadband and mobile phone subscriptions, these 
connections being the means by which online content is accessed (akin to television receiving 
equipment before the Internet age). However, Internet service providers (ISPs) and mobile 
operators could be expected to oppose such a move, and there would also be the issue of 
multiple payments by households (or even individuals) with several subscriptions. 
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3. Purposes of PSB 
To assess the suitability of alternative funding systems, this section identifies the purposes of 
PSB in today’s world and considers what these imply as criteria for a desirable funding 
mechanism.10  
The public service mission to ‘inform, educate and entertain’ given to the BBC in the 
1920s by its founding Director General, John Reith, can still be seen in UK’s 
Communications Act 2003. To paraphrase, section 264 of the Act sets out the purposes of 
PSB as follows: the provision of programmes dealing with a wide range of subject matters, 
meeting the needs and interests of many different audiences; maintaining high standards in 
programme content and production quality; giving comprehensive and authoritative coverage 
of news and current affairs; and the provision of educational programming. These purposes 
can be divided into two broad concerns: 
1. Consumer market failures: will the market deliver what people themselves want to 
watch, specifically the diversity and quality of programming needed to satisfy 
everyone’s tastes. 
2. Citizenship concerns: programming that is important for educational, democratic or 
social reasons which we would like everyone – other people as well as ourselves – to 
watch. 
At the heart of both concerns lie externalities associated with television programming, a 
textbook source of market failure.11 In economics an externality is an effect (either positive 
or negative) on one or more third parties that arises as a by-product of a production or 
consumption decision. For example, viewing of educational programming brings about wider 
benefits to society and the economy; these are positive externalities. The public policy 
concern is that programmes generating positive externalities are produced – the market will 
usually under-provide – and that these are actually watched, without which the intended 
benefit will not be realised. 
3.1. Consumer market failures 
Milton Friedman praised the market for its ability to give consumers the products that they 
individually desire. Comparing market provision with political systems where ‘tyranny of the 
majority’12 prevails, Friedman wrote, 
[t]he characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to 
require or enforce substantial conformity. The great advantage of the market, on the 
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other hand, is that it permits wide diversity. It is, in political terms, a system of 
proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were, for the color of tie he 
wants and get it; he does not have to see what color the majority wants and then, if he 
is in the minority, submit. (Friedman 1962, p. 15) 
However, as pointed out by Waldfogel (2007), this is not always correct: when the market 
can support just a limited number of product types, the market caters for only the most 
popular tastes. Then individuals with minority tastes find that they cannot obtain their desired 
‘color of tie’: there is the tyranny of the majority in market provision, just as in political 
representation. Waldfogel terms this phenomenon ‘the tyranny of the market’: for small 
groups with non-standard preferences, the market sometimes fails to deliver.13 
At the heart of this problem lie preference externalities: by adding to or taking away 
from the majority taste, each consumer’s preference affects the likelihood that other 
consumers are served.14 This interdependence can be seen when populations change over 
time: a small group of incomers with distinct preferences finds that its desires are not met, but 
as this group grows to form the majority its preferences come to dominate, and the original 
population may then find that its needs are no longer so well served. An individual benefits 
from a better matching of his or her own preferences when like-minded consumers come into 
the market and loses out when consumers with different tastes become the dominant group. 
The incidence of tyranny of the market in broadcasting has altered with technological 
changes in the sector. The following describes the phenomenon in, respectively, analogue 
terrestrial television and today’s television landscape. 
3.1.1. Traditional market failures of analogue terrestrial television 
In analogue terrestrial television, spectrum scarcity severely limits the number of channels 
that can be transmitted, restricting the choice of programmes available to viewers at any 
moment in time. This tight constraint gives rise to tyranny of the market. The problem is 
worsened when lack of a conditional access system prevents viewers from paying directly for 
programming: instead commercial television relies on advertising revenues and will therefore 
aim to attract groups of highest value to advertisers, being the most numerous and/or those 
with the greatest propensity to purchase the advertised product or service. As the lengthy 
economics literature on market failures of analogue free-to-air television 15 explains, this 
results in little diversity of programming with a tendency to duplicate mass market tastes 
while niche interests are under-served; low quality, because broadcasters cannot tap into 
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consumer willingness to pay for better programmes; and excessive amounts of advertising, 
which tends to annoy viewers. The ‘consumer’ aspect of PSB can be interpreted as a remedy 
for these traditional market failures. 
3.1.2. New distribution platforms, digitisation and globalisation 
With the development of new distribution platforms and digitisation of existing ones, the 
capacity constraint of analogue terrestrial television has effectively disappeared. Entrants find 
it more worthwhile to serve niche audiences than further to subdivide the mass market, 
especially when also given the ability to charge viewers directly, as in pay TV. Globalisation 
of distribution aggregates pockets of demand in each country, facilitating the production of 
programmes serving minority tastes. However, this does not mean that all consumer 
preferences can be served: the substantial fixed cost of producing each programme must be 
covered collectively by the sales that the programme achieves, in competition with others; 
thus preference externalities are not entirely eliminated. 
While these changes undoubtedly improve market provision for minority tastes 
compared with analogue terrestrial television, the outcome is not guaranteed to achieve the 
consumer optimum and distributional concerns may remain over provision for particular 
groups. While some commentators, such as Anderson (2004, 2006), point to the growth of the 
‘long tail’ of niche products, other factors tend to increase the focus on a relatively small 
number of products. By facilitating global accessibility, Internet distribution may increase 
sales by the most talented artists or ‘superstars’ at the expense of weaker ones.16 Producers 
may respond to increased demand (e.g. due to globalisation) by investing more in each 
product,17 raising product quality but limiting the expansion of diversity. 18 Evidence on 
search and recommendation systems is mixed: despite facilitating the discovery of new 
content, these can also create a rich-get-richer effect for popular products and reduce sales 
diversity. Theoretical analysis (see Weeds 2012) and empirical evidence 19  suggest the 
coexistence of superstars and the long tail: although the long tail has grown, in sales terms it 
is a very skinny one and demand is increasingly concentrated on a small number of hits.  
In addition, globalisation can result in the ‘tyranny of alien majorities’. As Waldfogel 
(2007) explains, by diverting demand to foreign products, trade may undermine the viability 
of domestic content. Moreover, as domestic producers shift their focus towards global 
markets they are likely to reposition their output to suit international rather than local tastes. 
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Accordingly, products which reflect local culture may be crowded out by homogenised 
global fare.  
The tyranny of the market provides a rationale for some degree of intervention in 
television broadcasting. According to this ‘consumer’ purpose, PSB should aim to stimulate 
the production of content meeting the preferences of national, regional and minority groups 
that would not be well served in the global marketplace. Indeed, this concern is reflected in 
the objective of many national broadcasting regimes to increase production of content 
meeting local and national preferences.  
Implications for PSB funding models are as follows. First, subscription is 
unproblematic: viewers desire the content and are willing to pay for it, although some subsidy 
from a licence fee, household levy or general taxation is likely to be required (otherwise why 
wouldn’t the market provide?). There is also little reason to prohibit advertising: this provides 
useful additional revenue which, as long as the intensity of advertising is not excessive, 
benefits consumers and taxpayers by reducing the amount needed from other sources. 
3.2. Citizen concerns 
Viewing of certain television programmes can bring about wider benefits to society beyond 
the individual viewer. Television can be an educational tool; it is an important source of news 
and information; and it can play a role in shaping social values and building social cohesion. 
These benefits, which can be described as ‘social externalities’, give rise to another form of 
market failure. There are two main categories of social externalities in television, described 
next. 
3.2.1. Political information and debate 
Television is an important source of political information and forum for debate. Economics 
literature in the area, surveyed by Strömberg (2015), highlights two key roles for the media in 
politics: ensuring that voters are fully informed and monitoring the actions of elected 
representatives. Since in a democracy all citizens are affected by such outcomes, these 
involve positive externalities, and coverage of news and current affairs is likely to be under-
produced and under-consumed from the social perspective. 
A further concern is the possibility of media bias: media coverage may favour certain 
politicians or interest groups in order to influence democratic decisions. This concern is 
reflected in the media plurality rules in UK merger control, intended to ensure that the 
number of distinct voices and opinions being expressed is not unduly diminished. The 
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broadcasting code of the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the regulator and competition 
authority for the UK’s communications industries, requires impartiality and accuracy in news 
reporting by all television broadcasters. Another protection against media bias is the 
existence of independent and trusted news broadcasters – including, but not only, the BBC – 
which would not wish to forfeit their reputation for high quality and impartial news 
coverage.20 
Political considerations have the following implications for the funding of PSB. The 
need for news media to be independent of government and interest groups calls for funding 
sources that are free from political control: direct funding out of general taxation would give 
the government of the day undue influence over the public broadcaster, and even a licence fee 
or household levy is not entirely free from political influence if there is government 
involvement in determining its level, as is likely given that this is a form of taxation.21 
Advertising funding carries a danger of bias in favour of major advertisers,22 though it should 
be noted that other UK public service broadcasters, notably Channel 4 and ITV, are entirely 
advertising-funded and yet are highly regarded news reporters, suggesting that this problem is 
not insurmountable. 
Perhaps the only source of funding which is free from political or interest group 
influence is subscription, whereby payment is decentralised to individual viewers. But the 
exclusion of non-payers tends to conflict with the aim of stimulating viewing of 
programming with positive externalities. If subscription is found to limit viewing, especially 
by less well-informed groups whose engagement might be of particular concern, then wider 
social benefits will fail to be realised. In any case, the presence of positive externalities 
suggests that market provision via subscription will under-provide news and current affairs 
programming, calling for supplementary funding from another source to mitigate under-
production. 
3.2.2. Education and social values 
Television can play a role in educating us and shaping our social values. Recent empirical 
studies, comprehensively surveyed in DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2015), identify positive 
effects of television viewing in promoting various educational and social policy aims, 
including: 
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• Education: Television access is found to raise English standards for children of 
immigrants in the United States; Sesame Street, a programme for preschool children, 
is found to have a positive impact on achievement in school. 
• Fertility: Brazilian soap operas (‘novelas’) which provide role models of smaller 
families have a significant impact on family size; the American reality television 
series 16 and Pregnant is found to increase Google searches and Twitter messages 
containing birth control-related terms during and after the broadcast and to reduce 
births to teenage mothers in the following 18 months. 
• Health: There is some evidence that soap operas can raise awareness of health issues 
and perhaps influence behaviour. 
The proliferation of audio-visual content available to viewers poses a particular 
challenge to the effectiveness of PSB interventions aimed at social and educational purposes. 
These benefits come about only if the relevant programming is watched, but viewers’ choices 
are driven by their desire for entertainment, and an enormous amount of content is now 
available to choose from. This competition for attention makes it difficult for socially worthy 
programming to gain a large audience and achieve its purposes.23 Recognising this point, 
John Reith believed in the ‘brute force of monopoly’ as a means for the BBC to control what 
people watched; this is not remotely possible now. The problem facing PSB was put 
succinctly by Richard Eyre, then Chief Executive of ITV, in 1999: 
[f]ree school milk doesn’t work when the kids go and buy Coca-Cola because it’s 
available and they prefer it and they can afford it.  So public service broadcasting will 
soon be dead. (Eyre 1999, p. 5) 
One way to mitigate this problem is an approach akin to ‘product placement’ used by 
advertisers: integrating public service messages into popular programmes.24 When this is 
understood the following comment by then Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell, criticised in the 
press at the time, makes a lot of sense: 
those episodes of EastEnders that tackle difficult issues of child abuse, drug taking, 
teenage pregnancy, and so forth, are actually – when they do it responsibly – 
providing an important public service. (Quoted in The Independent 2004) 
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On the assumption that the challenge of gaining viewer attention can be met, social 
externalities justify some degree of public subsidy for suitable programming. Since the 
benefits accrue to society as a whole and not just to television viewers, there is an argument 
for using a broader form of taxation than the TV licence fee, with the choice between general 
taxation and a household levy depending on other factors such as distributional concerns 
(which might favour the former) and the stability of funding for the BBC (which would 
favour the latter). The need to promote viewing of socially beneficial programming militates 
against subscription funding as the exclusion of non-payers is likely to conflict with this aim. 
Advertising finance poses no particular problem; the intensity of advertising should be 
determined by balancing its annoyance to viewers, which may reduce viewing, against the 
increase in programme expenditure and reduced need for funding from other sources that it 
allows. 
4. Assessment of alternative funding models 
The main alternatives to the existing TV licence fee system are as follows: 
• modernised licence fee, reformed to close the iPlayer loophole; 
• universal household levy paid by all UK households, not just those that watch 
television, perhaps with some concessions; 
• voluntary subscription, as part of a hybrid funding model alongside the licence fee or 
a household levy; 
• direct government funding out of general taxation; and 
• advertising and sponsorship revenue from the sale of advertising airtime, programme 
sponsorship and product placement. 
The UK government’s consultation paper for the BBC Charter review (DCMS 2015a) puts 
forward the first three options, while dismissing the other two. A sixth source of funding 
should also be borne in mind as a supplement to revenue from the licence fee or an 
alternative system: 
• Commercial income, largely from licensing of BBC programmes to overseas 
broadcasters. 
Drawing on the analysis in Section 3, this section assesses the relative merits of the possible 
funding sources for the BBC. 
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4.1.  Modernised licence fee 
If we leave aside the implementation issues already discussed above, there are a number of 
advantages to a modernised licence fee. One is its near-universality: since payment is 
compulsory for all TV viewers, it does not deter viewing except by a very small number of 
people who then decide not to watch television at all. This aspect is important for content that 
confers positive social externalities, for which broad reach is desirable, but less important in 
the case of preference externalities since once the content is available the relevant consumers 
will subscribe voluntarily. Once the level of the licence fee is fixed the system is independent 
of government – an important consideration for political independence – but the current 
institutional arrangements for setting the UK’s licence fee leave scope for political influence. 
Being a compulsory payment with a stable base (on the assumption that the threat from 
online viewing is removed), the licence fee generates predictable income for the BBC. 
The licence fee has a number of drawbacks, however. Collection is expensive, 
especially when costs to the criminal justice system are added in, 25  compliance is not 
universal26 and the effectiveness of enforcement is limited by reliance on self-reporting and 
visits to unlicensed premises rather than a technological conditional access system. Being 
unrelated to income, the fee is regressive, and criminalisation of licence fee evaders – with 
the possibility of imprisonment for non-payment of the fines imposed for evasion – is 
controversial.27 Popular acceptance of the licence fee may fall further as viewers spend less 
time watching BBC programmes and increasingly come to regard a payment that is unrelated 
to use of its service as unfair.  
A less obvious implication of the licence fee system is the BBC’s institutional need 
for popularity. In order to maintain popular support for the licence fee the BBC has to 
provide ‘something for everyone’, running the risk of confusing the (desirable) aim of 
achieving large audiences for programming that serves public purposes with the (more 
debatable) aim of chasing ratings for their own sake. It matters what types of programming 
achieve large audiences; as Patricia Hodgson, then Chief Executive of the Independent 
Television Commission (ITC) and now Chairman of Ofcom, put it when she contrasted the 
populist Celebrity Sleepover and nature documentary The Blue Planet, 
Beating ITV with Blue Planet is a triumph! Beating it with Celebrity Sleepover is a 
tragedy! (Hodgson 2002, p. 11) 
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4.2. Household levy 
According to recent press reports (Sweny 2015; Plunkett and Martinson 2015), a household 
levy is the funding model favoured by the BBC and the UK Department of Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS). As well as being simpler to implement than the proposed modernisation 
of the licence fee, a household levy would have a number of advantages over the present 
system. Collection and enforcement costs could be kept down by linking with existing 
household payments such as council tax or a utility bill, and criminalisation of non-payers 
could then be abolished. The levy could be banded or exemptions applied for low-income 
groups to make it progressive. The BBC’s income would be stable and predictable, probably 
more so than under the licence fee.  
As a means of achieving the widest possible reach for programming that confers 
social externalities, a household levy is advantageous: access to BBC services would be fully 
universal, unlike under the licence fee, as there would be no incentive to forgo television in 
order to avoid payment. On the other hand, a household levy is arguably more unfair than the 
licence fee as it also draws in those with no interest in watching television. However, on the 
basis that viewing certain television content generates wider benefits to the whole of society, 
it is perhaps justified that all beneficiaries – rather than just television viewers (to the extent 
that these are not all the same people) – contribute to its production. Like the licence fee a 
household levy generates an incentive towards ‘something for everyone’ programming in 
order to maintain popular acceptance of the funding system, which may at times overtake 
public service objectives. 
As for the licence fee, once its level is determined a household levy would be 
independent of government. However, depending on what institutional arrangements are put 
in place for setting the levy there may be scope for political influence at this point, so the 
implications for the BBC’s political independence are again not clear-cut. 
4.3.  Direct government funding 
Like a household levy, government funding out of general taxation links payment for socially 
valuable programming to all beneficiaries rather than television viewers, in keeping with the 
social externalities rationale for PSB. It removes the need to collect a distinct TV-related 
charge, so avoiding additional collection costs, and to the extent that the tax system is 
progressive it improves upon the regressive character of the licence fee. Government funding 
might also lessen the BBC’s need to court popularity as viewers no longer pay for it directly, 
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which may improve incentives to produce content that is of public value rather than merely 
popular. On the other hand, the BBC’s connection with its viewers might be lessened as its 
accountability shifts more obviously to the government. 
There are two major drawbacks of direct government funding. By making its funding 
directly and continually dependent on the government, it places the BBC’s political 
impartiality at far greater risk than under either the licence fee or a household levy. This 
factor alone militates strongly against this approach. The BBC’s funding would also become 
much less stable, being subject to current pressures on the public purse. Indeed, in the current 
fiscal environment of austerity, far from the BBC being brought onto the government’s 
books, the UK has instead seen public costs being transferred to the BBC. Consequently this 
approach is highly unlikely to be adopted.  
4.4 .   Subscription 
By being directly linked with television viewing and allowing viewers to pay for what they 
want, perhaps with different tiers or packages, subscription is fair in the sense that the 
greatest beneficiaries pay the most. Many viewers are now familiar with the concept of 
paying for television, and more will become so as online audio-visual services develop 
further. As Gavyn Davies foresaw in 1999, 
the digital age will increasingly be one in which many or most consumers of 
television pay for packages closely tailored to their needs. As they become more 
accustomed to choice, to subscription and to pay-per-view, it could be that the licence 
fee will come to seem an anachronism. (Davies 1999, p. 144) 
With the amount(s) being set by the BBC and payment decentralised to individual viewers, 
subscription would make funding entirely independent of government and vested interests. 
Accordingly a subscription system would protect the BBC’s political impartiality and is 
superior to the other funding options in this regard. 
Subscription is an appropriate funding system for programming that is purely of 
private benefit: willingness to pay is a more reliable measure than surveys of what consumers 
actually value, and the need to attract subscribers gives the provider a strong incentive to 
produce the programmes that viewers want. However, as a funding model for programming 
that generates wider social benefits, subscription has a number of drawbacks. First, the loss of 
universality – as some people choose not to subscribe – conflicts with the need for broad 
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reach to bring about social aims. Second, subscription creates a strong incentive for populist 
programming, in a more direct way than the other funding systems noted above. Finally, the 
implications for collection costs are mixed: while enforcement can be simplified relative to 
the licence fee by using a conditional access system, the need to attract and bill subscribers 
incurs marketing and subscriber management costs. There would also be an up-front cost of 
setting up an encryption system for the digital terrestrial television (DTT) platform on which 
most viewers currently access programmes using a free-to-air receiver. 
Subscription on its own is insufficient to fund the types of programming discussed in 
Section 3: some additional subsidy from public sources is needed (otherwise why wouldn’t 
the market provide?). However, this does not necessarily imply that no subscription funding 
should be used, at least for programming whose value accrues to the individual consumer 
with few wider social benefits. Moreover, if the BBC wishes to produce purely populist 
programming, there is little reason why this should not be subscription-funded, and no 
subsidy is required for this. 
4.5.  Advertising and sponsorship 
For advertisers as for public broadcasters, reach is highly important. In this sense advertising 
funding complements rather than conflicts with public objectives. However, the audience 
groups most desired by advertisers are not necessarily the same as those which might be the 
focus of public broadcasting. Thus, despite the shared desirability of reach it is possible that 
the targeting of content to maximise advertising revenues may be somewhat different from 
the pursuit of social aims.  
Advertising funding is independent of government, supporting political independence. 
While concern might be raised that programme content could be influenced by advertisers’ 
interests, potentially resulting in the suppression of adverse reports about large corporations, 
the success of other public service broadcasters (such as the UK’s Channel 4 and ITV) in 
operating respected news services despite reliance on advertising funding suggests that this 
danger is not insurmountable. 
Advertising and programme sponsorship could be used alongside any of the above 
funding methods to reduce the funding requirement from viewers and/or taxpayers. Even pay 
TV channels often carry advertising: although viewers may suffer some annoyance from 
advertising, they benefit from lower subscription charges and/or greater programming 
investment than would otherwise be possible.  
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Although other advertising-funded broadcasters could be expected to lobby against 
competition from the BBC in the supply of advertising airtime, advertisers would benefit 
from the increased availability of advertising airtime and the ability to reach individuals who 
watch little television other than the BBC. Interestingly, when in 2008 French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy announced a plan to ban the country’s public broadcasters from carrying 
advertising, he was criticised for removing €800 million (£600 million) in advertising 
revenue from public broadcasting and handing this to his media tycoon friends. 
4.6.  Commercial income, especially from overseas 
Commercial income, consisting largely of licensing fees paid by overseas broadcasters for 
BBC programmes, makes a small but useful contribution to the BBC’s budget: in 2014–15 
the BBC’s commercial arm, BBC Worldwide, contributed £226.5m to the BBC’s PSB arm 
(BBC 2015, p. 135). While this may appear to be a ‘free lunch’, converting the domestic 
popularity of many BBC programmes into commercial successes overseas, there are two 
issues to consider. 
The first issue is the ease of overseas access to BBC content via iPlayer and the 
challenge this presents to the way in which the BBC makes its content available to UK 
viewers. As discussed in Section 2, geo-blocking is an imperfect solution to this problem. A 
more effective method of blocking access to iPlayer by overseas viewers, perhaps by 
requiring a TV licence number and UK address to be entered, would protect the licensing fees 
paid by overseas broadcasters for BBC programmes. The BBC may prefer to launch 
international versions of iPlayer, with a different selection of programmes and tailored 
pricing, as a means of accessing overseas demand directly; indeed, it has recently been 
reported that the BBC plans to launch an online subscription service in the US in 2016, 
hoping to earn a £30m annual return (Mance 2015). The European Commission has also 
expressed a desire to see iPlayer made available to consumers elsewhere in the EU (although 
no proposals have yet been put forward): Andrus Ansip, Vice President in charge of the 
Commission’s DSM strategy is reported as saying at a stakeholder forum in Brussels on 24 
February 2015: 
 . . . you can only download or stream BBC iPlayer TV programmes while you are 
inside the UK. In the off-line world this would be called discrimination. In the online 
world it happens every day. I want to pay, but I am not allowed to. I lose out, they 
lose out. How can this be a good thing? (Mundell 2015) 
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A less obvious concern is the possibility that the desire to earn overseas revenues 
comes to exert a greater influence on programme content. Waldfogel (2007) notes the effect 
of cross-border trade in ‘globalising’ the character of audio-visual products: as US movie 
studios became more focused on winning international audiences, they repositioned their 
output towards global tastes and shifted away from idiosyncratic American interests. If BBC 
content were to become driven more by the need to earn commercial revenues in international 
markets rather than purely serving UK viewers and domestic public purposes, its 
effectiveness in achieving the latter aims may be weakened. 
5. Summary and recommendations 
Table 1 summarises the performance of the five main funding models for PSB (omitting 
commercial income, which can supplement any system) on a range of criteria.  
Table 1: Summary of funding models’ performance on five criteria 
Funding model Broad reach Political 
independence 
Incentive toward 
social value 
Fairness Collection and 
enforcement 
Licence fee () ? ?   
Household levy  ? ? ?  
Govt. funding      
Subscription     ? 
Advertising () ()    
 = criterion achieved; () = caveats to achievement of criterion;  = criterion not achieved; ? = questionable or mixed 
outcome. 
Table 1 suggests that the licence fee – even when modernised to capture iPlayer – is 
dominated by a household levy, which is superior or similar in performance on every 
criterion. By overcoming the incentive for a few individuals to forgo television in order to 
avoid the licence fee, a household levy supports truly universal reach. The levy can be made 
progressive with a banding system or exemptions, although the fairness may be debated of 
imposing the charge on households that have no interest in watching television themselves 
but may benefit from the social purposes promoted by the viewing of others. Collection and 
enforcement of a household levy is simpler and cheaper than for the licence fee, which should 
also facilitate decriminalisation (again boosting fairness). The political independence of 
either charging system is sensitive to the process by which its amount is set; the current 
mechanism could be improved upon by establishing an independent commission similar to 
Germany’s Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten (KEF). In 
relying on broad popular support, the two systems similarly generate an incentive for populist 
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over socially beneficial programming. Taken in the round, this analysis suggests that the 
licence fee should be abandoned in favour of a household levy, or another system. 
Despite scoring well on other criteria, government funding out of general taxation 
conflicts with the need to protect the BBC’s political independence, and for this reason alone 
it is not a strong contender to replace the licence fee. The likely instability of the funding 
stream may also harm programme investment. In any case, this approach would run against 
the tide of the current environment of fiscal austerity in which costs are instead being shifted 
from central government on to the licence fee, making it highly unlikely to be adopted. 
Subscription is a poor funding model for content that generates significant social 
externalities as it restricts access and directs programming towards paying viewers rather than 
enhancing social value. In its favour, as a decentralised payment system it is the least 
susceptible to political or interest group influence, but there is a tension between these two 
aspects. If political independence rather than externalities is the overriding concern, 
subscription may be a desirable funding model for a news service; however, this would be a 
move away from the BBC’s long-standing role as the primary source of television news for 
many viewers. Subscription might be best considered as a supplement to a free-to-air service 
funded from a licence fee or household levy, used to fund encrypted premium channels which 
are of interest to limited groups of viewers and which confer few external benefits. Viewers’ 
growing familiarity with paying for their chosen content from multiple providers also 
supports this approach. Even then, tyranny of the majority must be borne in mind: the 
market’s tendency to underserve minority groups with limited ability to pay is one of the 
rationales for public intervention in broadcasting.  
Advertising funding has a number of advantages: it promotes broad reach, though not 
necessarily sharing the same target audience as public broadcasting; it avoids the perceived 
unfairness of most of the other systems; and it is straightforward to collect. Independence 
from government is strong, and the evidence from other public broadcasters suggests that any 
conflict of interest with major advertisers is manageable. While advertising creates some 
annoyance for viewers, when the intensity of advertising is modest this is offset by the 
reduced need for funding from viewers or taxation and the availability of additional funds for 
programme investment. Other than tradition, there seems little reason for advertising on the 
BBC to be disregarded. 
To conclude, while modernising the TV licence fee to close the iPlayer loophole 
would patch up the gap that has opened in the current system, remedying its most obvious 
21 
 
 
defects, it would be preferable to replace the licence fee altogether as it is dominated by other 
funding models. The closest replacement, sharing and extending its benefits with fewer of its 
drawbacks, would be a household levy. Despite some advantages, direct government funding 
should be ruled out due to its susceptibility to political influence. Subscription may be a 
useful top-up for non-essential services where achieving broad reach is less important. 
Meanwhile, in the light of public funding pressures perhaps it is time for the historical ban on 
the carrying of advertising by the BBC to be reconsidered. 
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Annex A  
Funding of public service broadcasters around the world 
Table A1 sets out the funding sources for public service broadcasters in a number of 
countries. Licence fees remain commonplace, being found in Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Norway and Sweden (this list is not exhaustive). In a few countries (Australia, Canada 
and the Netherlands) the public broadcaster is directly funded by the government. In some 
countries (Canada, France, Germany and Ireland) public broadcasters also carry advertising, 
in contrast with the BBC, although the BBC’s public service counterpart Channel 4 is funded 
entirely from advertising revenue.  
Table A1: International comparison of funding for public service broadcasters (2014) 
Country Main source of finance Annual amount (euros)      Advertising? 
Australia Government grant n/a No 
Canada Government grant n/a Yes 
Denmark Licence fee 327 No 
Finland Income-related tax 140 (max) No 
France Licence fee 133 Yes 
Germany Household levy 216 Yes 
Ireland Licence fee 160 Yes 
Italy Licence fee 113 No 
Japan Licence fee 132 No 
Netherlands Government grant n/a Yes 
Norway Licence fee 365 No 
Sweden Licence fee 238 No 
United Kingdom Licence fee (BBC only) 179 No (but Channel 4 
entirely ad-funded) 
Sources: House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee (2015), own research. 
Notably, two countries have recently reformed their funding model, abandoning a 
licence fee system in favour of different alternatives. In 2013 Germany replaced its licence 
fee with a household levy. This is charged at a flat rate per household with exemptions for 
certain low-income groups (e.g. welfare claimants and students); businesses also pay the 
levy. In the same year Finland replaced its licence fee with an income-related tax, 
hypothecated to the funding of its public broadcaster, YLE (and hence known as the ‘YLE 
tax’). The payment is a fixed percentage of income with an upper limit of €140 per person 
and an exemption for low incomes; as in Germany, businesses are also liable for the tax 
(House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee 2015). 
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Annex B 
BBC funding and expenditure 
The UK’s TV licence fee is currently set at £145.50 per year for a colour licence, raising total 
revenue of £3,735m in 2014/15 (BBC 2015, p. 134). In addition the BBC receives income 
from its commercial subsidiary, BBC Worldwide, which contributed £226.5m to the BBC’s 
PSB division in 2014/15, representing around 5.5 per cent of the latter’s annual budget (BBC  
2015, p. 135). 
Most of the BBC’s licence fee and other revenues are used to fund its television, 
radio, online and ‘red button’ (information) services and to cover licence fee collection costs, 
but a small amount is top-sliced to provide content and services for the Welsh language 
broadcaster S4C and to fund a variety of additional public purposes including rural 
broadband and the BBC World Service (see Table A2). From 2018–19 the BBC will take on 
responsibility for funding free TV licences for the over-75s at an anticipated cost of £250m in 
2018–19, rising to £450m in 2019–20 and £750m in 2020–21(Martinson and Plunkett 2015). 
From 2020 the BBC is to be granted control over the over-75s policy which may allow it to 
reduce the subsidy. 
Table A2: Expenditure of the BBC (PSB Group), 2014/15, £m 
  
TV 2,367.8 
Radio  652.5 
BBC Online & Red Button 201.0 
S4C 107.0 
BBC World Service 253.6 
Licence fee collection 101.4 
Broadband rollout 150.0 
Digital switchover 0.4 
Local TV 2.9 
Other 385.3 
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURE  4,221.9 
Source: BBC (2015). 
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Annex C  
UK public service broadcasters 
Table A3 summarises the UK public service broadcasters, detailing for each its ownership 
structure (public corporation or commercial company), accountability and regulation, rights, 
duties and funding sources. 
Table A3: Summary of UK public service broadcasting 
Broadcaster Ownership;  
accountability; 
regulator(s) 
Rights Duties Funding 
BBC Public (statutory 
corporation);  
Licence fee payers, 
Parliament, citizens; 
BBC Trust, Ofcom 
Funding 
Spectrum 
‘Must carry’ rules 
EPG prominence 
Public service remit 
Universal availability 
Licence fee 
Channel 4 / 
S4C (Wales) 
Public (statutory 
corporation);  
Parliament, citizens; 
Ofcom (S4C: also S4C 
Authority) 
Spectrum  
‘Must carry’ rules  
EPG prominence 
Public service remit, 
‘innovative’ character 
Universal availability 
Advertising 
(S4C: also some 
funding from 
BBC) 
ITV, 
Channel 5 
Commercial company; 
Shareholders; 
Ofcom 
Spectrum fee  
    reduction 
‘Must carry’ rules  
EPG prominence 
Public service remit 
(now more limited) 
Universal availability 
Advertising 
Note: Electronic programme guide (EPG) prominence means that the channel is given one of the top slots in the 
channel listing.  
25 
 
 
References 
Anderson, C. (2004) ‘The Long Tail’, Wired Magazine 12, 170–7. 
Anderson, C. (2006) The Long Tail. London: Random House Business Books. 
Anderson, S. and J.Waldfogel (2015) ‘Preference Externalities in Media Markets’, ch. 1 in S. 
Anderson, J. Waldfogel and D. Strömberg (eds), Handbook of Media Economics, vol. 1A. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland. 
Armstrong, M. and H. Weeds (2007) ‘Public Service Broadcasting in the Digital World’, in P. 
Seabright and J. von Hagen (eds), The Economic Regulation of Broadcasting Markets: 
Evolving Technology and Challenges for Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
BBC (2015) BBC Annual Report and Accounts 2014/15. London: 
BBC. http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/annualreport/pdf/2014-15/bbc-annualreport-201415.pdf 
(accessed 21 December 2015). 
BBC Trust (2015) Response to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s Charter 
Review Consultation.  Technical Annex C: Funding. October. 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/charter_revie
w/annex_c_funding.pdf (accessed 21 December 2015). 
Cox, B. (2004) Free for all? Public Service Television in the Digital Age. London: Demos. 
Davies, G. (1999) The Future Funding of the BBC. Report of the Independent Review Panel 
London: Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/bbc_funding_review/reviewco.pdf (accessed 
21 December 2015). 
DCMS (Department for Culture, Media and Sport) (2015a) BBC Charter Review Public 
Consultation, 16 July–8 October 2015. London: 
DCMS. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/44
9830/DCMS_BBC_Consultation_A4__1_.pdf (accessed 21 December 2015). 
DCMS (2015b) TV Licence Fee Enforcement Review. Presented to the Houses of Parliament 
pursuant to section 77 of the Deregulation Act 
2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4452
12/166926_Perry_Review_Text-L-PB.pdf (accessed 21 December 2015). 
26 
 
 
DellaVigna, S. and E. La Ferrara (2015) ‘Economic and Social Impacts of the Media’, ch. 19 
in S. Anderson, D. Strömberg and J. Waldfogel (eds), Handbook of Media Economics, 
vol.1A. Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland. 
Elstein, D. (2004) Beyond the Charter: The BBC after 2006. Report of the Broadcasting 
Policy Group chaired by David Elstein. London: Premium Publishing. 
Eyre, R. (1999) ‘Public Interest Broadcasting – A New Approach’, James MacTaggart 
Memorial Lecture, Guardian Edinburgh International Television Festival, 27 August 
1999.  Available at http://www.thetvfestival.com/website/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/GEITF_MacTaggart_1999_Richard_Eyre.pdf (accessed 21 
December 2015). 
Farchy, J., M. Gansemer and J. Petrou (2013) ‘E-book and Book Publishing’, ch. 31 in R. 
Towse and C. Handke (eds), Handbook on the Digital Creative Economy. Cheltenham 
and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Hodgson, P. (2002) ‘Freedom to Flourish: The Future of Communications’, Royal Television 
Society Fleming Lecture, 5 March. Available 
at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/the_key_issues/presentations_speeches_rep
orts/index.asp.html (accessed 21 December 2015). 
House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee (2015) Future of the BBC: 
 Fourth Report of Session 2014–15 (HC 
315). http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmcumeds/315/315.p
df (accessed 21 December 2015). 
Independent (2004) ‘Watching with Tessa’, 2 March.  
Mance, H. (2015) ‘BBC to launch Netflix-style service in US’, Financial Times, 17 
September. 
Martinson, J. and J. Plunkett (2015) ‘BBC to take on £750m cost of subsidy for over-75s in 
licence fee deal’, Guardian, 6 July. 
Mundell, I. (2015) ‘Geoblocking targeted in digital single market strategy’, Politico, 24 
February. 
27 
 
 
Oborne, P. (2015) ‘Why I have resigned from the Telegraph’, openDemocracyUK, 17 
February.  https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/peter-oborne/why-i-have-
resigned-from-telegraph (accessed 21 December 2015). 
ONS (Office for National Statistics) (2006) News Release: Classification of Public Sector 
Television. 20 January.  London: ONS. 
Peacock, A. (1986) Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC (Cmnd 9824). London: 
HMSO. 
Plunkett, J. and J. Martinson (2015) ‘BBC licence fee replacement gets backing from culture 
secretary’, Guardian, 9 September. 
Revoir, P. (2015) ‘BBC iPlayer “watched by more than 60 million people outside the UK for 
free”’, Guardian, 21 July.  
Rosen, S. (1981) ‘The Economics of Superstars’, American Economic Review 71, 845–58. 
Strömberg, D. (2015) ‘Media Coverage and Political Accountability: Theory and Evidence’, 
ch. 13 in S. Anderson, D. Strömberg and J. Waldfogel (eds), Handbook of Media 
Economics, vol.1A. Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland. 
Sutton, J. (1991) Sunk Costs and Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Sweny, M. (2015) ‘BBC backs replacing licence fee with universal levy’, Guardian, 7 
September.  
TV Licensing (2015) Switched On: TV Licensing Annual Review 
2014/2015. http://www.tvlicensing.co.uk/ss/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheadername1
=content-
type&blobheadervalue1=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blob
where=1370006281969&ssbinary=true (accessed 21 December 2015). 
Waldfogel, J. (2007) The Tyranny of the Market: Why You Can’t Always Get What You Want. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Weeds, H. (2012) ‘Superstars and the Long Tail: The Impact of Technology on Market 
Structure in Media Industries’, Information Economics and Policy 24(1), 60–8. 
Weeds, H. (2013) ‘Digitisation, Programme Quality and Public Service Broadcasting’, ch. 2 
in R. Picard and P. Siciliani (eds), Is there Still a Place for Public Service Television? 
Effects of the Changing Economics of Broadcasting. Oxford Reuters Institute and BBC 
Trust. 
28 
 
 
Whittingdale, J. (2015) Culture Secretary keynote to Royal Television Society Cambridge 
Convention.  Gov.UK, 16 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/culture-
secretary-keynote-to-rts-cambridge-convention (accessed 20 December 2015). 
 
29 
 
 
Notes 
                                                            
 
1 On 7 July 2015 it was revealed that, in a behind-closed-doors deal, the BBC had agreed to absorb the cost of 
free TV licences for the over-75s and in return the government had agreed to increase the TV licence fee in line 
with inflation, end top-slicing to fund rural broadband, and close the ‘iPlayer loophole’ (see Section 2). 
2 While the article continues to refer to the system as public service broadcasting, its extension into non-linear 
on-demand distribution suggests this should perhaps now be termed public service media. 
3 In January 2006 the UK’s Office of National Statistics (ONS) reclassified the TV licence fee as a tax rather 
than a service charge, stating by way of explanation that ‘the licence fee is a compulsory payment which is not 
paid solely for access to BBC services’ (ONS 2006). 
4 At the time of writing the BBC channels are: BBC One, BBC Two, BBC Three, BBC Four, BBC News, BBC 
Parliament, CBBC, CBeebies and BBC Alba; on the DTT platform the last of these is available in Scotland 
only. From February 2016 BBC Three will become online-only, viewable through BBC iPlayer. 
5 In a quantitative survey conducted as part of the BBC Trust’s public consultation on the three funding options 
for the BBC proposed in DCMS (2015a), 35% of respondents preferred a modernised licence fee, 24% preferred 
a licence fee topped up with subscription and 23% preferred a universal household levy (with 18% replying 
‘don’t know/none of these’). However the report comments in paragraph 5 that ‘[t]he results do suggest some 
confusion around what the new household levy and the topped up licence fee would involve in practice. This 
indicates that the public would require a greater level of detail on how the system would work in practice in 
order to form an educated opinion’ (BBC Trust 2015, p. 4). 
6 The BBC first launched a regularly scheduled television service on 2 November 1936 but this was suspended 
at the outbreak of World War II in 1939. 
7 Note that the availability of BBC services without payment is not exceptional: since 1971 radio listening has 
not required a licence, and the BBC’s Internet services – including its popular BBC News website – are also 
exempt. However, an exemption for accessing the same content at different times seems anomalous. 
8 ‘Geo-blocking’ refers to the practice of restricting access to Internet content based on users’ geographic 
location, usually identified from their IP address. 
9 Estimate obtained from a survey by GlobalWebIndex (Revoir 2015). 
10 A more detailed analysis of the rationale for PSB can be found in Weeds (2013). 
11 While market failure may not be the only rationale for PSB, it is the approach that provides the clearest guide 
to where public intervention is needed and the form this should take. As Gavyn Davies wrote in 1999, ‘some 
form of market failure must lie at the heart of any concept of public service broadcasting. Beyond simply using 
the catch-phrase that public service broadcasting must “inform, educate and entertain”, we must add “inform, 
educate and entertain in a way which the private sector, left unregulated, would not do.” Otherwise, why not 
leave matters entirely to the private sector?’ (Davies 1999, p.10). 
12 As described in the Federalist Papers and by writers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill. 
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13 Waldfogel (2007, p.22) gives the example of peanut allergy sufferers: around 1% of the US (and UK) 
population is allergic to peanuts and consuming even a tiny amount of peanut can be life-threatening for these 
individuals, yet in some food categories it is difficult to find any products that are entirely peanut-free. 
14 Preference externalities in media markets are analysed in detail by Anderson and Waldfogel (2015). 
15 Surveys can be found in Armstrong and Weeds (2007) and Anderson and Waldfogel (2015). 
16 The economics of superstars is analysed by Rosen (1981). 
17 This ‘endogenous fixed costs’ story is discussed at length in Sutton (1991). 
18 Empirical studies spanning a variety of media markets, surveyed by Anderson and Waldfogel (2015), find 
higher-cost, higher-quality products in larger markets, providing evidence of endogenous fixed costs. 
19 A summary of empirical findings on demand shifts with digitisation is given in Farchy et al. (2013). 
20 Interestingly, news coverage was not high on the agenda of the early BBC as its Director General, John Reith, 
wished to avoid treading on the toes of the newspaper barons. The BBC’s reputation for timely and reliable 
news coverage was built during World War II, when it also established its political independence. 
21  Institutional structures are important in this regard. In Germany, for example, an independent auditing 
commission (Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten, KEF) reports on the 
funding needs of public service broadcasters and makes a recommendation to state governments. 
22 This concern has recently been highlighted by Peter Oborne in his criticism of The Telegraph’s coverage – or 
lack of it – of adverse news stories concerning banking group HSBC, a major advertiser in the newspaper 
(Oborne 2015). 
23 A similar problem faces advertisers, who also struggle to gain viewer attention for their adverts and their 
message across in today’s media environment. 
24 Radio soap The Archers, conceived in the 1950s as a means of promoting good farming practice to increase 
food production, was an early example of this method. 
25 According to the DCMS TV Licence Fee Enforcement Review led by David Perry QC, published in July 2015, 
in 2013 there were 178,332 prosecutions for failure to hold a TV licence, representing 11.5% of cases before the 
Magistrates’ Court (DCMS 2015b, p. 10). However, this is likely to overstate the proportion of court costs as 
cases are typically dealt with very quickly, with most defendants making a written plea of guilty and very few 
appearing in court. The review also reports that in 2013 32 people were imprisoned for non-payment of a fine 
imposed for licence fee evasion (2015b, p. 85). 
26 TV Licensing, which is responsible for collection, estimates that evasion amounted to around 5–6% of 
households in 2014–15, costing the BBC between £195m and £234m in lost revenue (TV Licensing 2015).  
27 In February 2015 the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee report, Future of the 
BBC (2015, p. 122) put forward its view ‘that criminal penalties for the non-payment of the licence fee and the 
way enforcement is carried out is anachronistic and out of proportion with the responses to non-payment for 
other services’ but acknowledged ‘the possibility […] that decriminalisation could lead to an increase in evasion 
and potentially, therefore, a reduction in the BBC’s income.’ 
